SoS Brad Raffensperger is requesting money so that he can make the election When the funding request was broken down further, it amounted to the following:
Raffensperger began his plea for the Elections Division funding by claiming:
“Since day 1, election security has been my top priority and will continue to be so,” and then he referred to Georgia’s system as “battle-tested.” He then asserts that Georgia is a “national leader in elections” because they were the first state to have implemented “the trifecta of automatic voter registration, at least 17 days of early voting, which have been called the ‘Gold Standard’, and ‘no excuse’ absentee voting.”
When asked by Senator Burns about the effectiveness of the poll pads, and Raffensperger said that it went very well with the exception of a few localized snafus. Next, Senator Brandon Beach asked about the “nine vulnerabilities” in the Halderman Report. Raffensperger replied that it would. But, he didn’t say what they did to correct the nine issues or how they were going to fix the problems. They say that they have no faith that these proposed budget because they claim the alleged fix would make the system more vulnerable.
From The Halderman Report:
…in reviewing the processes it will require an update of the nearly 45,000 pieces of voting equipment, along with the subsequent acceptance testing. This process will take tens of thousands of manhours. Therefore, the statewide move to 5.17 will occur following the 2024 election cycle. This will allow the state and counties to focus on executing municipal elections and running the Presidential cycle. It also allows the state to put together a thoughtful, thorough plan to roll out the latest software.
Specifically regarding the “patch” of the BMDs, he states:
Some of the critical vulnerabilities I discovered can be at least partially mitigated through changes to the ICX’s software, and I encourage Dominion and the State of Georgia to move as quickly as possible to remedy them. However, merely patching these specific problems is unlikely to make the ICX substantially more secure. I did not have the resources to find all possible exploitable security bugs in the ICX software. Once I found one that satisfied a particular adversarial objective, I usually turned to investigating other aspects of the system. It is very likely that there are other, equally critical flaws in the ICX that are yet to be discovered. Fully defending it will require discovering and mitigating them all, but attackers would only have to find one.
And relating to the replacement of the previous system, Halderman states:
The ICX BMDs can be compromised to the same extent and as or more easily than the AccuVote TS and TS-X DREs they replaced. Both systems have similar weaknesses, including readily bypassed user authentication and software validation, and susceptibility to malware that spreads from a central point to machines throughout a jurisdiction. Yet with the BMD, these vulnerabilities tend to be even easier to exploit than on the DRE system, since the ICX uses more modern and modular technology that is simpler to investigate and modify.